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Abstract

nuclear nonproliferation commitments, such as the Nuclear

The comprehensive analysis presented here attempts to ana-

Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the Comprehensive Safeguards

lyze “newcomer” states in the Middle East and North Africa

Agreements (CSA), and the Additional Protocol (AP), which will

(MENA), primarily the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Unit-

raise the transparency of the civilian nuclear program.

ed Arab Emirates (UAE), seeking to implement civilian nuclear
energy according to their political and economic situations. By

Introduction

investigating their motivations and funding resources for fu-

Rapid population growth and increased electricity demands

ture nuclear projects, this analysis provides guidance for these

(for both water desalination and electricity generation) are

states in terms of their nuclear infrastructure and nonprolifera-

major energy challenges for governments around the world.

tion. The overall approach of this analysis relies on the factors

Many governments believe that nuclear energy is one of the

for the success of civilian nuclear energy programs identified

safest, most reliable, and most cost-effective energy sources

in experiential studies conducted since the Atoms for Peace

that can provide electricity for long periods of time. According

speech in 1953. This study also attempts to reduce the gap

to reports by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),1

between developing and developed states by clarifying the ma-

nuclear power demand is expected to increase between a low

jor challenges involved in nuclear cooperation and technology

projection of 17 percent (if the current market remains and few

transferal.

changes in resources and technology occur) and a high projec-

Since the 1980s, the MENA region has experienced vari-

tion of 94 percent (if the rate of electricity demand and econ-

ous crises, including the Iraq-Iran War, the Gulf War, terrorist

omies continue to grow) of the world’s current total nuclear

attacks, the Arab Spring, and the Islamic State (IS). However,

power capacity by 2030. Thus, many states are seeking to im-

the two states analyzed here have maintained stable politi-

plement civilian nuclear energy programs. Experiential studies

cal environments without disturbances to their governmental

conducted since the Atoms for Peace speech in 1953 indicate

systems. Moreover, from an economic viewpoint, both states

that the essential factors that determine the success of such

have high revenue from oil and gas production and high oil

programs are as follows: 1) nuclear nonproliferation commit-

reserves (more than 20 percent of the world’s proven oil re-

ments (Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT], Comprehensive

serves). Regarding their motivation for seeking civilian nuclear

Safeguards Agreements [CSA], and the Additional Protocol

energy, these states are attempting to address their estimated

[AP]), 2) the political situation, and 3) the economic situation

8-9 percent annual increase in electricity demand, rapid popula-

(motivations, resources, and gross domestic product [GDP]).2

tion growth, and the need for more desalination plants. By im-

The goal of this paper is to analyze the “newcomer” de-

plementing nuclear energy programs, these newcomer states

veloping states in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA),

will face challenges related to their nuclear strategy, roadmap,

primarily the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and United Arab

infrastructure, and human resources. To address these chal-

Emirates (UAE), seeking civilian nuclear energy. Additionally,

lenges, the newcomer states will have to secure intense for-

an overview of both states from a nuclear nonproliferation and

eign cooperation by signing nuclear agreements with devel-

infrastructure perspective that satisfies the essential require-

oped states and showing a clear record of compliance with

ments for the successful development of civilian nuclear ener-
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gy is provided. This study attempts to bridge the gap between

Table 1. Date of NPT Signature or deposit for the states in the MENA region

newcomers and developed states, which can be achieved by

NPT Agreement

clarifying a number of the major and initial difficulties that affect

States

both types of states in the process of cooperation and technol-

Signature or Deposit
Date

States

Signature or
Deposit Date

ogy transfer. The presented analysis will investigate the politi-

KSA

3 October 1988

Syria *

1 July 1968

cal and economic environments of both states. Politically, this

UAE

26 September 1995

Lebanon

1 July 1968

study will analyze the stability of the governmental system as

Kuwait

15-22 August 1968

Egypt

1 July 1968

a strong indication of the entire political framework of the tar-

Oman

23 January 1997

Libya *

July 1968

geted state. This study will investigate economic motivations

Qatar

1989

Algeria

12 January 1995

and resources from an energy perspective as well as consider

Bahrain

3 November 1988

Tunis

1 July 1968

a general GDP-based perspective.

Iraq *

1 July 1968

Jordan

10 July 1968

Morocco

1 July 1968

Background
Studies on the development of civilian nuclear power that focus on similar objectives are rare, although two studies by Jew-

* Non-compliance status
Source: United Nations Office for Disarmament Affair (UNODA)
Note (light blue): KSA and UAE are the primary focus of this study.

ell (2011) were found in literature.3,4 These studies performed
analyses of the motivations and capacities for deploying civil-

developed states as well as the IAEA.7,8 In this study, a com-

ian nuclear energy in fifty-two aspirant states and then in five

mon ground was defined for evaluating a political situation in

North Africa states. The evaluations included financial and in-

which a logical and reasonable indicator reflects the reality of

stitutional capacities as well as technical requirements for the

the government systems. Although this indicator may be con-

electricity grid. The institutional capacity was measured by the

troversial, it is unique because it is based on logic and reality.

World Bank Political Stability Index (PSI) and the World Bank

The indicator is based on the results of previous crises that the

Government Effectiveness Indicator (GEI). The financial capac-

government systems in the MENA region, particularly KSA and

ity was measured by GDP and GDP/capita. Although the use

UAE, have experienced. These results will be further detailed

of PSI and GEI are logical and reasonable when evaluating in-

in the political situation section.

stitutional capacities, both indicators are subject to debate. For
example, although Pakistan, India, Argentina, Brazil, and Russia

Role of the NPT

have operational nuclear power plants (NPPs), these countries

The NPT is a very important commitment and considered one

present low PSI or GEI; therefore, these states have overcome

of the primary concerns of the international community with

the PSI and GEI indicators, met all of the technical require-

regard to nuclear energy. This treaty defines the privileges,

ments, and managed the financial difficulties. The results of

responsibilities, and obligations for the 191 state parties and

the second study showed that Libya and Tunisia had the top

ninety-three signatory states involved.9,10 The three pillars of

two PSI among North Africa states: however, both of these

the NPT are the promotion of nuclear arms control and disar-

governmental systems have been toppled and the countries

mament, the prevention of nuclear weapon development, and

are unstable.

The PSI and GEI were founded on different in-

the encouragement of peaceful cooperation.10,11 However, the

ternational efforts, covering a wide range of sources. However,

NPT is one of the major factors in the successful development

these indicators were highly influenced by Western and Euro-

of civilian nuclear energy.2 Table 1 shows the date of the NPT

pean cultures, which are different from the cultures of MENA

signature or deposit of ratification for the states in the MENA

states.

Region.9 As parties to the NPT, all MENA states have signed

5,6

Historical observations have indicated that under certain

the NPT or deposited their instruments of ratification.

circumstances, such as a lack of capability or capacity, strong

Note that most of MENA states were early signatories

motivations could make up for the required capabilities or ca-

to the NPT; in addition, Syria, Iraq, and Libya are currently in

pacities. Therefore, a thorough investigation will not be con-

non-compliance status.12-14 The KSA and UAE are two of the

ducted in this study with regard to the technical requirements,

later signatories to the NPT. Both states apparently understand

which will eventually be addressed through cooperation with

that any perception of non-compliance with the NPT may breed

24
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distrust from the international community, which will generally
affect their future nuclear activities. By maintaining compliance

Table 2. Future population, energy demand, and renewable water in the
Gulf States

with the obligations and commitments of the NPT agreement,
Gulf States

the chances of international cooperation will be much higher,
particularly if the political and economic situations in both states

Population
(Million) A

Energy Demand B
(Terawatt/Hours)

Renewable Water
Per Capita C
(Cubic Meters)

2015

2030*

2015

2030*

2015

2030*

KSA

28.8

38.8

101.0

317.0

83.0

66.0

UAE

9.3

12.5

99.5

315.0

28.9

23.0

bility. An indicator of governmental stability is a combination

Kuwait

3.4

4.5

66.4

138.0

5.7

5.0

of logic and the historical conditions, and such indicators for

Oman

3.6

4.8

13.9

28.9

836.6

350.0

Qatar

2.2

2.9

18.7

38.9

37.0

29.0

Bahrain

1.3

1.8

14.0

29.0

135.6

109.0

help support the need for a civilian nuclear energy program.

Political Situation
Political situation is measured based on the government’s sta-

MENA countries are developed by tracing the major changes in
the government system according to the various crises in the
region. Major changes in the government system have been
defined as changes in the entire presidential office, monarchy, or government cabinet. This study used major changes in
the governmental system as a strong indicator of the government’s stability.

Source: World Bank Data, which include recent (2015) population estimates and
an approximately 2 percent annual population growth rate.
A,

attacks,15 the Arab Spring,16 and the Islamic State (IS).17 Three

Compiled from Report on the Workshop: Nuclear Dangers Nuclear Realities21
and updated with recent data. The energy demand is increasing by 8-9 percent
for the KSA and UAE and by ~5 percent for the remaining Gulf States. The estimated decreasing percentage of renewable water is ~ (-2 percent) for all Gulf
States except Kuwait and Qatar, which is ~ (-1 percent).

of these crises, the Iraq-Iran War, the Gulf War, and the Islamic

* Indicates projected value

State, have not had a significant impact on the government

Note (light blue): KSA and UAE are the primary focus of this study.

B, C,

Since September 1980, five major crises have been identified in the MENA region: the Iraq-Iran War, the Gulf War, terrorist

stability of the MENA states that remain in compliance with
the NPT. However, terrorist attacks have impacted government

newable water requirements per capita by 2030 are shown in

stability in Lebanon,18,19 whereas the Arab Spring impacted the

Table 2. The increase in electricity demand is estimated to be

government stability in Egypt, Yemen, and Tunisia.

Over the

approximately 8-9 percent per year for KSA and UAE,22,23 and

short term, the political environment in certain states in the

this increase will be caused by population growth and industri-

MENA region will prevent developed states from cooperating

alization. Both states rely on water desalination plants because

towards the development of civilian nuclear energy programs.

of the lack of surface and ground water. In the near future,

However, the governmental stability of both the KSA and UAE

population growth will drive the need for increased desalination

have not been impacted by these crises. Thus, regional crises

plant capacity, which will require greater amounts of electricity.

should not necessarily preclude the successful implementation

The current solution is to continue building additional plants to

of nuclear power technology within the safeguards prescribed

burn more oil and gas to meet the demand regardless of the

by the IAEA. For example, in 2015, Egypt and Russia signed a

mandates of the climate conference in Paris in 2015, which will

memorandum of understanding regarding the construction of

place additional pressure on both governments with regard to

NPPs.

energy resources.

20

16

Therefore, these activities are possible if the stability

of the government is strengthened post-crisis.

Table 2 shows that KSA will face the largest increase in
energy demand and population among the Gulf States, with

Economic Situation
Motivation for Seeking Civilian Nuclear Energy

UAE in second place. Both states are motivated to seek civilian

The largest countries among the Gulf States in terms of their

tion, 2) the yearly increases in demand for electricity, and 3) the

economies are using approximately one third of their daily pro-

need for more desalination plants. To this end, discussions on

duction of oil and gas to produce electricity.21 The estimated

the implementation of civilian nuclear energy were announced

increases in the population growth, energy demands, and re-

by both governments.21-23 The UAE has started the construction
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of four pressurized water reactors,22 whereas, KSA has merely

GDP perspective,26,27 whereas the UAE has an estimated GDP

announced the creation of King Abdullah City for Atomic and

of $269.8 billion and a GDP/capita of $29,900 (2013 estimate),

Renewable Energy (KACARE), which remains in the planning,

which ranks the UAE second.26,28 The aforementioned, indicate

study, and evaluation stages. These two civilian nuclear ener-

that both states are wealthy and present a low risk of insuffi-

gy programs are collectively estimated to cost more than $100

cient funding for the long-term investment of a civilian nuclear

billion, rendering them among the largest nuclear programs

energy program.

23

of the century,

22,23

with KSA’s program costing $80 billion and

UAE’s program costing $20 billion. Apparently the huge budgets for these programs raises concerns as to whether the
states will be able to fund these long-term investments.

Status of Newcomer States Seeking
Civilian Nuclear Energy
United Arab Emirates (UAE)
UAE’s Nuclear Program Specifications

Funding Resources for Civilian Nuclear Energy

The UAE was the first state in the Gulf region to construct

In this section, a general overview of the economies of KSA and

nuclear reactors. As shown in Table 4, the four reactors are

UAE, which will include oil, natural gas, and GDP, is provided

named Barakah 1, Barakah 2, Barakah 3, and Barakah 4.22 Each

to gain an understanding of both economies. The Gulf region

of these reactors is an Advance Power Reactor APR1400,

is an area rich in oil, which is among the purest oil worldwide.

which is a light water reactor (LWR) that can produce 1,400

Additionally, both states have tremendous natural gas produc-

megawatts of electricity (MWe). The construction of the four

tion capacities and reserves. These Gulf State governments

reactors began in July 2012, May 2013, September 2014, and

financially rely on their production and reserves of oil and natu-

September 2015, and they are scheduled to be complete and

ral gas. According to the Organization of Petroleum Exporting

operational by 2017, 2018, 2019, and 2020 respectively. The

Countries (OPEC), in which the KSA has a leading role,

both

total capacity of the first phase of the UAE’s civilian nuclear

states are leading countries in oil production. Table 3 presents

energy program will be 5,600 (MWe); a second phase has not

data on the oil and gas reserves and production for both states.

been announced.

Table 3. Oil and gas data for the KSA and UAE

Table 4. UAE’s nuclear power reactors

Oil and Gas Data

KSA

24,25

UAE

Electricity
Production
(megawatts )

Construction
Date

Expected
Date
of Operation

Crude oil reserves
(million barrels)

265,789

97,800

Reactor’s Name
and Type

Natural gas reserves
(billion cubic meters)

8,317

6.091

Barakah 1, APR-1400

1400

July 2012

2017

Crude oil production
(thousand barrels/day)

9,637

2,797

Barakah 2, APR-1400

1400

May 2013

2018

Natural gas production
(million cubic meters)

100,030

54,600

Barakah 3, APR-1400

1400

Sep 2014

2019

Value of petroleum exports
(million dollars)

321,723

126,307

Barakah 4, APR-1400

1400

Sep 2015

2020

Source: Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), KSA and UAE
Facts and Figures24,25

Source: World Nuclear Association (2014), Nuclear Power in United Arab Emirates.22

Both states have sizable reserves and a substantial pro-

The four units will be supplied by a consortium that is led

duction capacity for gas and oil, which will maintain a stable

by the Korea Electric Power Company (KEPCO) and includes

economic status for several years. Several billion dollars of oil

Samsung, Westinghouse, Hyundai Engineering & Construc-

in the form of petroleum exports are added as revenue per day

tion, Doosan Heavy Industries, and KEPCO Subsidiaries.22

to the budgets of both states. According to the U.S. Central In-

In addition, a domestic waste repository is an option for the

telligence Agency (CIA), the KSA is an oil-based economy with

UAE’s nuclear program for medium- and low-level waste, and a

a GDP of $927.8 billion and a GDP/capita of $31,200 (2013 esti-

portion of the waste fuel will be sent to France for reprocess-

mate), which ranks the KSA first among the Gulf States from a

ing or to another country with a reprocessing plant. Studies on

26
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a domestic geological repository are being conducted with a

such as the fast breeder reactor (FBR).30 LWRs have another

Swedish company.

proliferation-resistance feature: when refueling, the entire

22

power plant must shut down, which enables easy monitoring
UAE’s Nuclear Program Strategy and Policy

of the NPPs by the IAEA.

The UAE government adopted a new model of approaching
civilian nuclear energy that non-nuclear weapon states have ex-

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA)

plored since the Atoms for Peace speech in 1953. This model

The KSA realized the need for nuclear technology in 1988 with

attempts to ensure the confidence and support of the interna-

the creation of the Atomic Energy Research Institute (AERI) in

tional community for the peaceful development of UAE’s civil-

Riyadh.31,32 The AERI was the first nuclear institute in the Gulf

ian nuclear program.

The UAE has shown the international

region, and although it was established as a research base, the

community that it is only interested in peaceful uses of nuclear

institute is now involved in many other activities. Initially, the

energy by adopting such models and signing various nonpro-

AERI was responsible for researching nuclear technology re-

liferation agreements as shown in Table 5. The UAE’s actions

lated to aspects such as agriculture, industry and health. The

aligns with policies in the developed states for transferring ci-

initial responsibilities of the AERI included the representation

vilian nuclear technology as well as with the high standard for

of the KSA in the IAEA as well as the creation of the regula-

nuclear nonproliferation that the international community aims

tory framework for nuclear energy in the KSA.33 The new city

to maintain.

(KACARE) announced by the King in April 2010 is intended to

29

expand the responsibilities of the AERI. KACARE will be reTable 5. UAE’s nonproliferation activities
Agreement’s Name

sponsible for the KSA’s civilian nuclear energy program and
Date of Signature or
Ratification

projects involving other renewable energy resources, including

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)

1995

representative to the IAEA. Since the inception of KACARE, the

Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSA)

2003

importance of achieving cooperation and agreement between

Additional Protocol (AP)

2009

KSA and other leading organizations has been acknowledged

123 Agreement with the USA

2009

The above nonproliferation activities are limited; the list does not include
all conventions.

By signing the 123 Agreement, the UAE pledged to import

solar and wind energy projects. KACARE will serve as KSA’s

for the development of KACARE’s strategies, roadmaps and
plans for civilian nuclear technology and other renewable energy resources.
KSA’s Nuclear Program Agreements and Cooperation

its nuclear fuel and forgo domestic fabrication, enrichment, and

KACARE has sought cooperation with many of the developed

reprocessing plants. To this end, the UAE signed various long-

states, and its achievements in terms of cooperation, which

term contracts to import nuclear fuel from international firms

were determined according to newspaper reports and KA-

at a fixed price.

The UAE also announced that these reac-

CARE’s website, include agreements with the following: 1)

tors would be operated through a joint venture with a foreign

Areva, France; 2) Investigación Aplicada (INVAP), Argentina; 3)

firm, with 60 percent ownership by the UAE government and

Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI), South Korea;

40 percent by the foreign firm for a period of 60 years.22 Sub-

4) China Nuclear Engineering Corporation (CNEC), China; 5)

sequently, the UAE’s civilian nuclear program will rely on the

Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK), Finland;

international market for its nuclear fuel.

6) Rosatom State Nuclear Energy Corporation, Russia; and 6)

22

The other nonproliferation steps considered by the UAE

Hungary.23 Prior to these cooperation agreements, the KSA had

include the selection of LWR and the lack of reprocessing

made several nonproliferation agreements, which are listed in

plants in the UAE’s territory. Developed states considered this

Table 6. The KSA signed the NPT in 1988, the CSA in 2009, and

approach to be an effective method for impeding the misuse

the Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) in 2005; thus far, an AP has

of nuclear technology. Under normal operations, LWR does not

not been signed (without an AP, the IAEA cannot provide cred-

produce high percentages of sensitive nuclear materials such

ible assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material

as plutonium ( Pu), in comparison to other types of reactors,

and activities). The KSA signed a memorandum of understand-

239
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ing for nuclear energy with the United States in 2008, and the

it can generate up to 100 MWe, and CAREM is a small pressur-

Taqnia Company (a Saudi company) set up a joint venture called

ized water reactor designed by INVAP (an Argentinean compa-

“Invania” with INVAP (an Argentinian company) in 2015 to de-

ny), and it can generate approximately 25 MWe, which renders

velop nuclear technology for the KSA by focusing on small re-

this type suitable for use as a research reactor (see Table 7).

actors, such as CAREM. The KSA has also engaged in various

The choice of LWRs for the KSA’s nuclear energy program is

negotiations regarding nuclear energy technologies with coun-

a smart option because of its proliferation-resistance features

tries such as the United States, Japan, the Czech Republic, and

and reduced capacity to produce sensitive nuclear material.

23

Britain; however, agreements have not been announced.
Table 7. The proposed nuclear reactor types in KSA
Table 6. KSA’s nonproliferation activities
Agreement’s Name

Date of Signature or
Ratification

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)

1988

Small Quantities Protocol (SQP)

2005

Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSA)

2009

Additional Protocol (AP) *

-

Reactor Name

Reactor Type

Electricity Production (MWe)

EPR

Pressurized water reactor

Up to 1,650 MWe

AP1000

Pressurized water reactor

Up to 1,200 MWe

SMART

Pressurized water reactor

Up to 100 MWe

CAREM

Pressurized water reactor

Up to 25 MWe

KSA’s Proposed Nuclear Fuel Cycle

* KSA has not yet signed the Additional Protocol (AP).

The president of KACARE has mentioned that KSA wants to be

The above nonproliferation activities are limited; the list does not include all
conventions.

an independent producer of nuclear energy, which implies its

KSA’s Proposed Nuclear Capacity

cluding enrichment and fabrication. The KSA has not proposed

KACARE announced that the initial capacity of the KSA’s nu-

plans to build a reprocessing plant; however, the sharing of

clear program would be 17-18 gigawatt-electric (GWe), which

such sensitive technology is limited because of the danger of

should be achieved by 2032. However, this estimate is mere-

using the separation technology to obtain “unirradiated direct

ly the initial plan, and it is subject to change. In January 2015,

use material,” which could be repurposed for military use. No

KSA officials announced that the targeted nuclear capacity will

official announcement or indicators regarding KSA’s proposed

more likely be achieved by 2040.23 KACARE plans to construct

nuclear fuel cycle have been presented. Therefore, KSA’s nu-

approximately sixteen reactors by 2032. If this initial plan is fol-

clear fuel cycle may involve one of the following scenarios: 1)

lowed, the first two reactors will be operating by approximately

the KSA may obtain nuclear fuel from outside sources, which

2022, and two reactors will subsequently be added each year

is similar to UAE’s nuclear fuel cycle; or 2) the KSA may build

until the completion of the sixteen reactors.34,35

fabrication and enrichment plants. The first scenario would

23

involvement in the major stages of the nuclear fuel cycle, in-

save time and increase the transparency of the KSA’s proposed
KSA’s Proposed Nuclear Reactor Types

nuclear program, whereas the second scenario would include

The type of nuclear reactor to be used by KSA’s nuclear pro-

mining, milling, enrichment, and fuel fabrication. If the KSA se-

gram has not been officially announced, although information

lects this path, then the Additional Protocol (AP) will have to

has been provided to newspapers and communicated via inter-

be signed to provide for higher transparency and enable the

views with the president and the vice president of KACARE.

IAEA to provide credible assurance of the absence of unde-

The first reactor type considered by KACARE is the European

clared nuclear materials and activities. If KSA is going to follow

Power Reactor (EPR), which is capable of producing up to

its initial nuclear plan (with its first reactors running by 2022),

1,650 MWe. The EPR is a third-generation pressurized water

then nuclear fuel will have to be imported because building and

reactor.36 Other reactor types that have been considered are

operating fuel plants and manufacturing fuel represent long-

the AP1000, SMART, and CAREM. The AP1000, which was de-

term investments. However, implementing these plans will

signed by Westinghouse Company (a U.S. company), is a third-

require more time than building the reactor itself. Therefore,

generation-plus pressurized water reactor that is capable of

a combination of both the first and second scenario is likely.

producing between 1000 MWe and approximately 1200 MWe.
SMART is a pressurized water reactor designed by KAERI, and
28
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Different Scenarios for Implementing
Civilian Nuclear Energy

design or construct its own reactor and it will slowly gain experi-

The implementation of civilian nuclear energy will initially re-

medium term (ten to twenty years). In the second scenario, the

quire the use of highly developed approaches and strategies

state will gain reasonable experience in reactor operation and

along with focused cooperation with developed states. From

maintenance early in the process and will gain capabilities for

a nuclear technology perspective, developed states are those

implementing most stages involved in reactor design and for

with advanced capabilities in reactor design and construction

performing full operations and maintenance. In the third sce-

(R-D&C) as well as reactor operation and maintenance (R-

nario, the state will be able to contribute to reactor design and

O&M). Developed states are governed by strict rules regarding

construction from the beginning of the implementation process,

the transfer of civilian nuclear energy technology to newcomer

and with time, the state will be able to design, construct, oper-

states because of the high standard of nuclear nonproliferation

ate, and maintain its own reactors. The second and third sce-

that the international community attempts to maintain. Table 8

narios are viable options for states with an INFCIRC/153-type

describes the common scenarios based on current strategies

safeguard agreement as long as an AP is enforced.

ence in reactor operation and maintenance over the short and

and government agreements for implementing civilian nuclear technology that have been observed since the Atoms for

Nuclear Proliferation Concerns

Peace speech in 1953.

Nuclear proliferation is an important global concern that led to

Each scenario (see Table 8) involves foreign and local con-

the creation of the IAEA in 1957.37 The initial mission of the

tributions. The advantage of the first scenario is that the country

IAEA was to control and promote peaceful nuclear technology

can implement a NPP in a short time to meet its increased elec-

via the development of the necessary legal frameworks, regu-

tricity demands, although at a limited capability. The disadvan-

lations and legislation.37 The global concern later resulted also

tages of the first scenario are that the state will not be able to

in the NPT and Safeguards Agreements (CSA) to be concluded

Table 8. Different scenarios for implementing civilian nuclear energy
First Scenario A

Second Scenario B

Third Scenario C

Time
Foreign
Contribution
Short Term
(7-10 years) and
Involvement Percentage
percent

Local
Contribution

Foreign
Contribution

Local
Contribution

Foreign
Contribution

Local
Contribution

R-D&C
100 percent
R-O&M
>90 percent

R-D&C
0 percent
R-O&M
<10 percent

R-D&C
100 percent
R-O&M
70-90 percent

R-D&C
0 percent
R-O&M
10-30 percent

R-D&C
60-75 percent
R-O&M
<70 percent

R-D&C
25-40 percent
R-O&M
>30 percent

Medium Term
(10-20 years)
and Involvement
Percentage percent

R-O&M
70-90 percent

R-O&M
~10-30 percent

R-D&C
>70 percent
R-O&M
<30 percent

R-D&C
<30 percent
R-O&M
>70 percent

R-D&C
~30 percent
R-O&M
<5 percent

R-D&C
~70 percent
R-O&M
>95 percent

Long Term
(more than 20 years)
and Involvement
Percentage percent

R-O&M
30-70 percent

R-O&M
30-70 percent

R-D&C
<10 percent
Special Supplies and
Consultant
<5 percent

R-D&C
>90 percent
R-O&M
>95 percent

Special Supplies
and Consultant
<5 percent

R-D&C
>95 percent
R-O&M
>95 percent

Comments: Depends on
the states’ strategies and
legal agreements.

1- State will find it difficult to contribute to
R-D&C.
2- State can provide limited contributions to
R-O&M.

1- State will find it easy to contribute to
R-D&C and may face challenges (in the shortto-medium term) in conducting its own R-D&C.

1- State can provide a greater contribution to
R-D&C and will be able to conduct its own
R-D&C.

2- State can fully contribute to R-O&M.

2- State can fully contribute to R-O&M.

A, Adoption of UAE’s civilian nuclear model
B, Adoption of China’s civilian nuclear model
C, Adoption of South Korea’s civilian nuclear model
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by non-nuclear-weapon states with the IAEA, which were fol-

Double Standard Argument

lowed by the AP in 1997.38-40 The CSA is an agreement that

All of the developed states have formed their own procedures

attempts to implement a verification method for assuring that

for cooperation when transferring peaceful nuclear technology

states comply with their obligations at all nuclear facilities with-

using official government agreements. One of the best exam-

in their territory and for preventing diversions of nuclear mate-

ples of a highly evaluated agreement is the 123 Agreement

rial from peaceful purposes to military uses.38,39

used by the United States. This agreement entails thorough

The AP was adopted by the IAEA in 1997 after the com-

evaluations of sensitive nuclear materials, equipment, and fa-

mencement of the clandestine Iraqi nuclear weapon program.

cilities by isolating sensitive nuclear plants, such as fuel fabrica-

The AP is an additional agreement for strengthening and im-

tion, enrichment and reprocessing plants.41 The disadvantages

proving the CSA by stipulating that states provide additional in-

of the 123 Agreement include the variations observed in the

formation on their nuclear programs and clarification as needed

agreement from state to state, which could reflect a double

to support IAEA inspectors and allow access to their nuclear

standard. The U.S.-UAE 123 Agreement clearly stated that the

facilities as well as any location specified by the IAEA.

UAE must forgo the right to implement fuel fabrication, enrich-

40

ment and reprocessing plants, which was also stated in Presi-

Sensitive Nuclear Plants and Materials

dent Obama’s letter to Congress in the context of the U.S.-UAE

An NPP is not considered to be sufficient for proliferation;

123 Agreement.41 The following statements will provide addi-

however, the fuel cycle process is considered the primary pa-

tional details on the U.S.-UAE 123 Agreement:

rameter for proliferation.31,38 The most important processes in
the fuel cycle are enrichment, fuel fabrication and reprocessing

First:

plants, and the knowledge required to separate isotopes, en-

“The United States and the UAE are entering into it in

hance specific isotope concentrations, and convert compounds

the context of a stated intention by the UAE to rely on

from one phase to another may be employed for military pur-

existing international markets for nuclear fuel services

poses. These plants are central to the proliferation concerns of

as an alternative to the pursuit of enrichment and

developed states. The nuclear materials that cause the great-

reprocessing. Article 7 will transform this UAE policy into

est proliferation concerns are: Pu,

a legally binding obligation from the UAE to the United

233

U and highly enriched

uranium (HEU) (235U 20 percent) when applied for direct use;

States upon entry into force of the Agreement.”

and thorium and U ( U <20 percent) when applied for indirect
235

use.38 However, the special nuclear materials

239

HEU

U have received special attention

Pu,

233

U and

Second:

because these

“In view of these and other nonproliferation features, the

nuclear materials (see Table 9) are associated with a quantity

Agreement has the potential to serve as a model for other

that is sufficient to produce a single nuclear bomb.

countries in the region that wish to pursue responsible

235

31,38

38

Table 9. Significant quantities for sensitive nuclear materials
Material

Significant Quantity
Direct Use Material

Plutonium

8 kg

U-233

8 kg

U-235 in HEU

25 kg of contained U-235

operation, terms, and conditions accorded by the United
States to the UAE shall be no less favorable in scope and
effect than those that the United States may accord to
any other non-nuclear-weapon State in the Middle East in
a peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement.”

U-235 in LEU

75 kg of contained U-235, 10 t of
natural uranium or 20 t of
depleted uranium.

Thorium

20 t

Source: IAEA Safeguards Glossary 2001 Edition, International
Nuclear Verification Series No. 3.
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Third:
“Confirmation by the United States that the fields of co-

Indirect Use Material

30

nuclear energy development.”

Obviously, the United States, as represented by the
Obama administration, has a special model for the MENA region, which is reflected in the new 123 Agreement with the
UAE signed in 2009. However, the United States confirmed

2016 Volume XLV, No. 1

that other states in the Middle East region will not receive any

Regarding the fuel cycle, developed states prefer new-

favorable arrangements in terms of cooperation, conditions,

comer states to import nuclear fuel to eliminate the risk of new-

and context in 123 Agreements. In other words, the United

comer states obtaining fuel fabrication and enrichment technol-

States is not willing to share enrichment and fuel fabrication

ogy. A double standard is arguably imposed with respect to the

knowledge to any interested nation in the Middle East. How-

fuel cycle for nuclear programs, which is reflected in certain

ever, the U.S.-Vietnam 123 Agreement signed in 2014 did not

international nuclear agreements, such as the U.S.-UAE 123

clearly state that Vietnam must forgo the right to implement

Agreement and the U.S.-Vietnam 123 Agreement. The stan-

these sensitive plants.42 Thus, the newcomer states in the

dard imposed in these agreements varies from state to state

MENA region must carefully evaluate the available international

depending on the political relations and situations between the

nuclear cooperation agreements to determine the most suit-

newcomer states and developed states. The establishment of

able agreement for their nuclear program.

fabrication, enrichment, and reprocessing plants is associated

41

with the potential use of sensitive nuclear materials and the

Conclusions

knowledge required for nuclear military applications. All leading

This paper attempts to analyze the newcomer states to the

states in the nuclear field are obligated to limit the sharing of

MENA region seeking civilian nuclear energy, primarily the KSA

their knowledge on sensitive nuclear materials and plants be-

and UAE, by investigating their political and economic situa-

cause such knowledge may lead to nuclear military applications

tions, including their motivations and funding resources. More-

unless the materials are subject to IAEA safeguards. Thus, af-

over, this study attempts to clarify a number of the major and

ter the general approach and strategy for implementing a civil-

initial difficulties that would be faced by both states. Because

ian nuclear energy program is established, the best standard

of the rapid increases in population growth and the increasing

for the specific newcomer state must be determined.

needs for desalination plants and demands for electricity, both
states have begun to evaluate and implement nuclear energy.

Thaqal Alhuzaymi is a PhD candidate in nuclear engineer-

Both states are politically and economically stable, which are
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validated by: 1) the governmental systems maintaining stabil-
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ity throughout the history of crises in the MENA region and
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2) the states maintaining economic stability through the high
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